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ABSTRACT 
 
Domestically-produced children’s television is frequently highlighted as both an area 
of market failure, and also as an area where children’s changing consumption habits 
necessitate new and different ways of thinking about funding children’s content 
across a range of platforms. In the light of a recent UK proposal to set up a Public 
Service Content Fund to support ‘genres’ under threat, including children’s 
programming, this paper considers how you fund diverse high quality children’s 
content in a more challenging media environment where children’s content is 
arguably still a market failure ‘genre’. The first part of the paper provides context by 
outlining the market failure characteristics of children’s content as a framework for 
analysing the validity of market failure arguments across a range of platforms. It then 
investigates the causes of perceived market failure in the UK children’s TV 
production market. The final part examines the implications of recent UK policy 
responses to provision for children that seek to address market failure through a) the 
possible introduction of a contestable fund for public service content b) more 
stringent obligations on the BBC and c) the re-imposition of quotas on commercially-
funded PSBs (ITV, Channel 4, Five). Drawing on regulatory and stakeholder 
responses, it concludes that attempts to overcome market failure in UK children’s 
television appear unsuited for funding the longer-term curation, distribution and 
discovery of new types of content on platforms other than broadcasting.  
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Public Service Broadcasting, Children’s Television and Market Failure: The 
Case of the United Kingdom 
Introduction  
Children’s television (TV) is still an important part of what public service 
broadcasting (PSB) institutions are supposed to offer, and most are explicitly called 
upon to serve young audiences as part of their public service mandate. Most PSBs are 
expected to provide free, universally available, non-commercial content to all 
children. Indeed, without engaging with young audiences, there is a danger that 
children will fail to be ‘enculturate [d]’ (Messenger Davies, 1995, p. 23) in the public 
service ethos, and gradually drift away, rendering PSB smaller in scope and scale by 
default. As a core public service component, children’s content could therefore be 
seen as existential for an extended interpretation of PSB towards Public Service 
Media (PSM) (Lowe and Bardoel, 2007) as PSBs seek to engage young audiences 
beyond broadcast television across different platforms in a networked society 
(Livingstone and Local, 2017).  
However, it could also be argued that the legitimacy of PSB children’s content is in 
fact undermined by the sheer abundance of what is now on offer commercially. After 
all there are reputedly over 400 children’s channels globally (Westcott and Stuart, 
2015), and swathes of free on-demand content on YouTube, or at a price on SVOD 
(subscription video-on-demand) services such as Netflix and Amazon Prime, who are 
ramping up commissioning of children’s programming to attract subscribers (Potter, 
2017). Nevertheless, in the face of proliferating competition some national 
commercial broadcasters (for example in Australia, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom - UK) have virtually withdrawn from children’s content 
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commissioning, ceding this to national PSBs, US transnationals, represented by 
Disney, Nickelodeon and Cartoon Network and SVODs (Steemers and Awan, 2016). 
There are then clearly limits to what some commercial media companies are willing 
to offer children at a satisfactory profit (Berg et al, 2014, p. 115), but does this 
constitute a market failure and justification for interventions like PSB?  
Focussing on recent UK debates about the future of public service TV programmes 
for children, this article poses the following research questions. First how do you 
define market failure in children’s content and what are the key issues?  Second how 
was market failure understood in the UK market for children’s television?  Third what 
are the implications for children’s content of recent UK policy initiatives to address 
market failure through a) the possible introduction of a contestable fund for public 
service content; b) more stringent obligations to children for publicly-funded PSB, the 
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation); and c) the re-imposition of quotas on 
commercially-funded PSBs (ITV/Independent Television, Channel 4, Five)?  The 
article concludes by arguing that recent policy decisions in the UK children’s sector 
could create obstacles to innovation because of an over-emphasis on the problems of 
domestic children’s television rather than those forces that are driving a new media 
eco-system in the children’s content market.  
The research presented here first provides context by unpacking the market failure 
characteristics of children’s television as a framework for analysing the validity of 
market failure arguments across a range of platforms. It then assesses the roots of 
perceived market failure in UK children’s TV. The final section analyses recent UK 
policy responses to provision for children and what these might mean for the long-
term future for production of UK-originated TV content for children. As a 
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contribution to debates within media management, the focus on policy-making for 
children’s programming and services goes beyond industry and company level issues. 
It does this by demonstrating the continuing and central importance of media policy in 
determining both the constraints and incentives that affect both managerial decision-
making and responsibilities. 
Findings are based on an examination of government and stakeholder documents 
including BBC Charter Review, analysis of interactions between stakeholders at 
public events, oral and written evidence to public inquiries, press reports and 
participant observation.1 Findings also draw on further analysis of data originally 
collected for the purposes of a stakeholder report (Steemers and Awan, 2016) on the 
funding of public service children’s content in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK.  
Children’s television as a market failure ‘genre’   
Helm (2005, p. 6) argues that the causes of market failure are ‘multiple’ and that such 
failures ‘rarely point straightforwardly to state provision or single-form solutions.’ 
This is certainly true of children’s television where various market interventions, 
including PSB, have been employed to address market irregularities. How then has 
market failure in the children’s TV market been articulated, and are these arguments 
still valid in a multiplatform environment? Historically children’s television may have 
demonstrated market failure in two ways: the failure of the market to allocate 
sufficient resources to children’s content, and secondly, the failure of the market to 
generate enough domestically-produced content to contribute to children’s sense of 
identity (see Doyle, 2013, p. 92). 
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Efficiency – the failure to allocate resources  
Children’s television is not a market failure in terms of quantity because of numerous 
channels showing copious amounts of cheaply acquired animation, often from North 
America and Asia, that is easily dubbed and repeated again and again as children 
grow up to be replaced by new generations of children (Steemers, 2010). Nor are 
children or children’s content alone in being pinpointed as segments of the audience 
or types of content that are potentially underserved by the market. Potentially 
underserved genres include religion, arts, education and classical music, while 
potentially underserved audiences may include those from BAME (Black, Asian and 
minority ethnic) communities and those residing in geographically marginalised areas 
(DCMS, 2016b, p.72; Ofcom, 2007b, p. 19). What makes the children’s content 
market different are perceptions of what this audience needs because of its immaturity 
and how this is best achieved.  
Where the children’s market is often deemed to fail is in supporting sustainable 
amounts of domestically produced first-run children’s content (D’Arma and 
Steemers, 2012), one part of the market for children’s content. This excludes the US 
whose large, wealthy, commercially-funded and mostly self-sufficient domestic 
market (Hoskins and McFadyen, 1991), has propelled US children’s content to 
international prominence, leveraging the global supremacy of Disney, Warner 
(Cartoon Network) and Viacom (Nickelodeon). Rather than commissioning content 
targeted at individual non-US markets, US transnationals have concentrated on 
content forms (animation, US-based sitcoms) and age-groups (preschool, 6-10 years) 
where audiences can be aggregated by age across borders for greater economic 
efficiency, but at the expense of cultural or geographic specificity (White and Preston, 
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2005). This was underlined in a 2012 study of what US-owned channels offer 
European children, revealing not unsurprisingly that they schedule predominantly 
(50-80 per cent) US shows (animation, sitcoms), leaving national PSBs as the main 
broadcasters of national content (Steemers and D’Arma, 2012).  
While there are numerous channels and several platforms for children’s content, there 
are few commissioners of original first-run children’s content because of 
consolidation among transnational commercial providers (broadcast and now SVOD), 
who operate alongside one or two state or public service providers in most countries. 
Beyond the US, other national markets have been too small to support home-grown 
children’s content on a sustainable commercial basis without policy interventions 
because there are few commercial benefits from the restricted advertising 
opportunities arising from small domestic child audiences with limited purchasing 
power. The most lucrative advertising has typically been for toys, snacks and 
beverages, supplemented by the small number of children’s properties (e.g. Peppa 
Pig, SpongeBob SquarePants) with value in licensed merchandise, mostly revolving 
around toys, publishing and games (Steemers, 2010). In recent years advertising 
restrictions have made children’s broadcast content even less attractive to domestic 
commercial players with bans on advertising for ‘junk’ food and fizzy drinks around 
children’s broadcast content in Australia, Germany, Greece, Norway, Sweden and the 
UK. Declining interest is particularly evident in reduced expenditure on original 
children’s content by commercial multi-genre broadcast channels, even in those 
countries with a strong tradition of domestic production for children including 
Australia (Screen Australia, 2013), New Zealand (NZ On Air, 2015), the UK (Ofcom, 
2017a), France (CNC, 2015) and Denmark.  
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A further aspect of resource allocation and a challenge for all broadcasters, are shifts 
by child audiences away from linear channels to online platforms (Livingstone and 
Local, 2017), necessitating research and investment into new types of content (short-
form, interactive), new creative tools and new ways of reaching (streaming, apps) and 
engaging (social media, personalisation) with young audiences (see BBC, 2017a) to 
maintain discoverability and relevance across on-demand platforms, which do not fit 
the broadcast model of scheduled appointments to view. For example, between 2011 
and 2016 viewing by UK children aged 4-15 of broadcast television on a TV set fell 
by a third to 101 minutes a day, as their watching shifted to other devices (Ofcom, 
2017a). In meeting these challenges of distribution and access, all broadcasters, 
aggregators and producers need to establish how they will fund new online and digital 
initiatives from a less certain funding environment, seeking, in the words of Alice 
Webb, Director of BBC Children’s, to ride the ‘two horses’ of online and broadcast 
platforms simultaneously (Webb, 2015).  
Failures to allocate resources to children’s content are also influenced by industry 
definitions of childhood. Childhood is a social and cultural construct with no fixed or 
agreed universal concept of what it means to be a child, or even of how long 
childhood lasts (Messenger Davies, 2010, p.7). This understanding also applies to 
television, where children’s programming departments, both PSB and commercial, 
rarely cater for children over twelve, even though the United Nations defines a child 
as anyone under eighteen (UN, 1989). This failure by industry to serve all children 
with diverse content, is compounded by the frequent labelling of children’s content as 
a genre (DCMS, 2015), although it comprises many genres (drama, factual, 
entertainment), targeted at diverse audiences (age, gender, ethnicity) in much the 
same way as adult content.  
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Failure to generate local content that contributes to children’s sense of identity 
Alongside the market’s failure to produce enough domestic children’s TV content in 
some markets, the children’s market could also be characterised by a failure to 
advance other desirable goals (see Doyle, 2013, p. 92). While desirable media policy 
goals for adults, underpinning support for PSB, might involve social cohesion and 
contributions to democracy and citizenship, justification for intervention in the 
children’s market usually centres on normative goals that children should be protected 
from harm, but should also have access to content that reflects their diverse lives, 
providing the ‘prerequisites to children’s participation in society’ (UN, 1989, Article 
17). Market failure in the children’s market is therefore linked to externalities or 
external effects that are deemed to require either negative regulation (to regulate 
against negative effects) or positive interventions (to regulate for positive outcomes) 
(D’Arma and Steemers, 2012).  
Negative regulation in the children’s market has focused on potentially adverse 
market impact on vulnerable children who need protection from commercialisation, 
inappropriate sexual or violent content, or technological overload (Palmer, 2006; 
Postman, 1982). However, as a merit good with positive effects, certain types of 
children’s content might be regarded as potentially beneficial and deserving of 
positive policy interventions, because they have ‘inherent value for society that 
extends beyond what can be measured or expressed in market terms’ (Doyle, 2013, p. 
95). Children’s provision is not the only example of a merit good. Arts or educational 
content might also come under this classification, but the reasoning here suggests that 
diverse and wide-ranging ‘quality’ originations for children such as news, drama and 
factual programmes, could stimulate children’s perception of themselves as citizens, 
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or encourage other forms of positive behaviour (healthy eating; care for others) that 
are beneficial to society (see Messenger and Thornham, 2007, pp.1-2). Children’s 
content becomes a desirable merit good in as far as it meets normative requirements 
to provide children with content that allows them to see their own lives and culture 
reflected on screen, a view reinforced by children’s media advocacy organisations 
like the UK’s Children’s Media Foundation (CMF), which campaigns for ‘content 
which is specifically made for them and connects them to the culture in which they 
live – in all its diversity’ (CMF, 2015, p. 3). Even if there is little quantifiable 
evidence that watching domestic content is more beneficial than watching imported 
content (Buckingham, 2009), what matters is whether governments are actually 
prepared to intervene to reinforce the perceived cultural value of particular types of 
domestic content in society’s interest, even if the arguments are not necessarily 
backed up by incontrovertible evidence.  
For broadcasting, obligations towards children have often been enacted through PSB 
remits, although these are not always specified in detail through transmission or 
output quotas (e.g. Denmark, Australia, Ireland). Market failure logic would suggest 
that to remain ‘distinctive’ PSBs need to provide precisely those things that the 
market does not. For linear broadcasting distinctiveness has typically been focused on 
domestically-produced news, drama and factual programming (Ofcom, 2007a, p. 7) 
rather than imported animation. At the BBC, for example, animation (including 
domestically-produced animation) has accounted for between 16-20 per cent of 
transmissions on CBBC, its channel for 6-12 year-olds and 30 per cent on pre-school 
channel, CBeebies (Steemers & D’Arma, 2012, p. 75; Ofcom, 2013, p. 30), compared 
to 60-75 per cent on most transnational channels and even some public service 
channels (Steemers & D’Arma, 2012, p. 75). The BBC has also been required to 
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transmit in excess of 70 per cent of original UK or European productions. However, 
the reality of how well PSBs serve children varies widely. While some enjoy high 
reputations for origination and creativity (UK, Nordic countries, Germany), others 
(Spain, Italy, Central and Eastern Europe) have struggled to be both popular and 
distinctive against commercial rivals because of a mixture of inadequate funding, 
limited domestic production, low prioritisation of child audiences, and decreasing 
political support for PSBs generally (D’Arma and Labio, 2017; Lustyik, 2013). 
Beyond PSB positive interventions in children’s content to combat market failure are 
clearly evident in countries, which have sought to regulate domestic commercial 
broadcasters through transmission and first-run origination quotas (Australia, France, 
Canada), levies on commercial broadcasters to subsidise production (France, Canada), 
expenditure obligations on broadcasters for animation (France) or children’s content 
(Canada), contestable funds that support children’s and other public service content 
(Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand)  and tax incentives to encourage investment 
(Steemers and Awan, 2016). These regulatory interventions show that domestic 
commercial broadcast players have frequently been regarded as important 
contributors to sustaining domestic children’s content alongside PSBs within a 
balanced production ecology (Steemers, 2010).  
However, these interventions in children’s broadcasting are less effective as children 
migrate to other platforms, raising questions about whether policy interventions 
should be extended to new platforms and services on the basis of market failure. 
These deliberations pose challenges to public service institutions in particular 
(Goodwin, 2014, p. 84), because while economic logic about externalities (positive 
and negative external effects) and merit goods could be used to justify new services 
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and platforms operated by PSBs, it does not necessarily exclude other providers 
(museums, charities and even for-profit organisations) from also offering publicly-
funded public service content on digital platforms (Goldsmiths 2016; Ofcom 2007b).  
Market failure in the UK   
Given the complexities of market failure in the children’s television market, how did 
arguments unfold in the UK in the wake of BBC Charter Review between 2015 and 
2017 when the UK Conservative Government directly addressed market failure in 
children’s television for the first time?  
When the UK Government published its Green Paper on the BBC in 2015 (DCMS, 
2015), few doubted that the UK children’s production sector had been in trouble for 
years. Between 2004 and 2014 first run UK originated children’s hours from the BBC 
and commercial PSBs combined slumped 64 per cent from 1,887 to 672 hours with 
expenditure dropping 44 per cent from £159 million to £88 million (Ofcom, 2015, 
p.13). The fall on both counts was mainly due to commercially-funded PSBs, 
primarily ITV, but also Channel 4 and Five, who in return for free-to-air broadcast 
licenses had been obliged in the past to serve children through transmission and 
output quotas. They were liberated from these obligations, when children’s content 
became part of Tier 3 PSB programming under the 2003 UK Communications Act, 
which did not allow quotas.  
The removal of quotas had consequences. Between 2004 and 2014 commercial PSB 
commissioned hours slumped from 555 hours to just 93 hours and investment in 
commercial PSB originations dropped from £48 million to just £3 million (Ofcom, 
2015, p.13). The withdrawal from commissioning was accelerated when a ban on 
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advertising for food and drink high in fat, sugar and salt (HFSS) was introduced 
around children’s broadcast content in 2006. By 2014 the BBC accounted for 95 per 
cent of total PSB expenditure on first–run UK children’s content and 86 per cent of 
commissioned PSB hours (Ofcom, 2015, p.13), but it too was scaling back because of 
budgetary pressures. Between 2004 and 2014 the BBC reduced its hours of first-run 
originations by 57 per cent (Ofcom, 2015, p. 13) as it pursued a ‘fewer, bigger, better’ 
strategy that concentrated spending on fewer projects (BBC Trust, 2009, p. 7).  
Other commercial channels, including the main US providers, did not plug the gap 
with their UK commissions dropping 61 per cent from 283 hours in 2010 to 111 hours 
in 2013 out of 136,311 hours broadcast (Ofcom, 2014a, p. 9). Nor has the arrival of 
online SVOD services, Netflix and Amazon, or a new commercial app from satellite 
broadcaster Sky, Sky Kids, compensated for downturns in UK commissioning. Some 
UK producers have benefited from Netflix and Amazon investment, but the number 
of commissions remains small and largely focused on internationally-oriented 
animation or drama productions with US leads (Blazeby, 2016) rather than content 
targeted specifically at UK audiences.  
It could be argued that the UK children’s television market has experienced three 
variations of market failure (Berg et al, 2014, pp.112-13). ITV which had been the 
largest investor in original UK children’s content until 2001, spending more than £70 
million (Ofcom, 2015a, p. 13), underwent a failure of incentive, because market 
conditions (more competition, ban on HFSS advertising) no longer made it possible to 
realise sufficient profit from children’s programming. ITV still supported a children’s 
channel, CiTV, relying on acquisitions and repeats (Ofcom, 2013, p. 9), but a rare 
foray into production, such as the remake of the 1960s Supermarionation property, 
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Thunderbirds, in 2015, was squarely aimed at building a brand for international 
family rather than local child audiences (Potter, 2017).  
This failure of incentive by ITV was compounded by a failure of regulation and 
enforcement (Berg et al, 2014), because regulator Ofcom (Office of Communications) 
no longer had the tools to enforce compliance because of the removal of enforceable 
quotas. For example, when commercial PSB, Channel 4, repeatedly failed to meet its 
annual statutory requirements to serve older children, all Ofcom could do was issue a 
letter of rebuke, requiring Channel 4 to do better next time (Ofcom, 2016).  
Yet according to the UK Government what had gone wrong was actually a failure of 
structure (Berg et al, 2014, p. 113) with the emergence of the BBC as practically the 
sole commissioner of domestic children’s content. In 2015, the UK Government 
suggested in its Green Paper on BBC Charter renewal that ‘a small amount of 
contestable funding’ from the licence fee might ‘introduce greater diversity of 
providers and greater plurality in public service provision’ within vulnerable public 
service ‘genres’ including children’s programming (DCMS, 2015, pp.114-115). 
Arguing that the BBC had a near monopoly in the children’s market it suggested that 
part of the licence fee might be ‘protected’ and redistributed to ‘alternative providers’, 
raising the spectre of renewed licence fee top-slicing for the BBC (DCMS, 2015, 
pp.114-115). 
Policy responses to market failure 
If UK children’s TV content was considered a market failure ‘genre’ what were the 
responses, and what might these mean for the long-term future of children’s content? 
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Between 2015 and 2017 three responses were formulated by policy-makers. These 
were: 
 Plans for a contestable fund for at risk genres including children’s content, 
conceived by the Conservative Government in the wake of BBC Charter 
Review, and put under consultation by the government in December 2016. 
(DCMS, 2016a) 
 The inclusion of first-run UK origination quotas for children’s programming 
in the BBC’s proposed operating framework, put out for consultation by 
Ofcom in March 2017 (Ofcom, 2017b). 
 The re-imposition of quotas on commercial PSBs, an intervention that was 
secured in an amendment to the 2017 Digital Economy Bill in April 2017. 
Contestable funding  
In May 2016, the UK government’s BBC White Paper proposed a £20 million a year 
pilot fund for at risk genres (arts, music, education, religion, children’s) and 
underserved minority and regional audiences, financed over three years from leftover 
licence fee funding that had been top-sliced from the 2010 licence fee settlement. 
Referencing similar funds that operate independently of public service institutions in 
Ireland (Sound and Vision) and New Zealand (NZ on Air), the fund would support 
content free at the point of use on platforms with an ‘appropriate reach’ (DCMS, 
2016b, p.9). Pointing to the BBC’s ‘near monopoly’ in children’s content, the 
government had argued that other providers offered content ‘with public service 
characteristics’ (DCMS, 2015, p.114) and that such a fund could ‘deliver quality and 
pluralistic public service content, using competitive forces to ensure the highest 
quality for the best value for money’ (DCMS, 2016b, p. 71). The proposed fund was a 
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political choice that clearly signalled that the BBC has no sole claim to the licence 
fee, with the Conservative Government expecting competition to encourage ‘new 
voices’ (DCMS, 2016a, p.2). Ostensibly designed to tackle the failure of incentive, 
the key question is whether such a fund would tackle market failure in the children’s 
market, by promoting greater diversity of providers (more commissioners) and more 
plurality in provision (a greater range of producers and by extension diversity). 
With few exceptions (Hyatt, 2015), industry and children’s advocacy stakeholders 
had reservations and were particularly opposed to top-slicing the licence fee to 
support contestable funding (CMF, 2015; Coba, 2015, p. 31; Frontier Economics, 
2016; Pact, 2015; VLV, 2015), fearing that it risked undermining BBC core funding 
over time. All expressed doubts about the efficacy of a fund targeted at reluctant UK 
commercial broadcasters and a vast online universe where content might easily 
disappear without promotion and marketing. 
When the Government published a consultation document on contestable funding in 
December 2016 (DCMS, 2016a), these arguments were elaborated, but recognising 
the government’s intentions, stakeholders with an interest in children’s content did 
address issues about the fund’s focus (narrow or broad), platform distribution, 
administration and award criteria (CMF, 2017a; Pact, 2017; VLV, 2017). 
Nevertheless, producers’ association, PACT (Producers Alliance for Cinema and 
Television), questioned the efficiency of the fund in promoting competition and 
whether it would have real impact without regulation to force broadcasters and 
platforms to support ‘at-risk’ genres. It feared that broadcasters would simply use the 
fund to finance content they would have funded anyway, diminishing overall 
production spend (PACT, 2017, p, 2). Reluctantly Pact advocated a children’s fund to 
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support development, top-up funding for existing commissions and funding for new 
players online. Commercial PSB, ITV expressed little enthusiasm for ‘taking public 
money’ because it did not want to accept the responsibilities and limitations of 
accepting financial support (cit. in CMF, 2017a; Frontier Economics, 2016; Pact, 
2017). The Children’s Media Foundation (CMF) welcomed the pilot if it focused 
solely on children’s content across all platforms, suggesting shared windowing and 
funding with commercial subscription platforms (Netflix and Sky), as well as support 
for ‘low-cost content’ by new entrants that would enhance ‘innovation, experiment 
and risk-taking’ (CMF, 2017a, p. 5).  
However, the small size of the fund (£20 million a year), the possible spread across 
children’s, arts and minority programming, uncertainties about match-funding and 
distribution, and the short duration of the project (2-3 years) underlined its limitations 
as a long-term solution. The key risk identified by stakeholders was that the 
government might top-slice the licence fee in future if the fund continued beyond the 
pilot phase, but without increasing overall funding for domestic children’s content, a 
risk also identified by regulator, Ofcom, in its third PSB review (Ofcom, 2014b, p. 
118). Political machinations about who might potentially access licence fee funding 
seemed to offer a slim lifeline to children’s television production, but failed to mask 
the greater risk to the licence fee being salami-sliced in future, potentially 
undermining the BBC’s finances and all those in the industry who rely on BBC 
commissions.  
First run-origination quotas and the BBC 
A further outcome of BBC Charter Review was the imposition of first-run origination 
and transmission quotas on the BBC for children’s content as part of a draft BBC 
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operating licence, put out to consultation by Ofcom in March 2017 (Ofcom, 2017b) to 
ensure that the BBC adheres to the new Charter and Agreement. Schedule 2 of the 
Agreement allows Ofcom to set requirements on the amount and prominence of 
certain ‘genres’ (children’s, arts, religion, music, comedy) that contribute to the 
BBC’s mission and purposes, but which may be ‘underprovided or in decline across 
public service broadcasting’ (HMSO, 2016, p.52).  
In the draft operating licence Ofcom raised broadcast transmission quotas for CBBC 
drama and factual programming to 1000 and 675 hours respectively from 665 and 550 
hours previously, alongside a news quota of 85 hours (Ofcom, 2017b). Annual quotas 
on first-run UK originations for CBBC (400 hours) and CBeebies (100 hours) are 
new, but replicate what the BBC had been commissioning in 2016, so halting further 
commissioning reductions. The BBC was also required for the first time explicitly to 
serve older children and teenagers, a requirement that goes further than the 6-12 age 
target of CBBC, a channel for pre-teen children. 
However, transmission and origination quotas targeted at linear channels, CBeebies 
and CBBC, seem at odds with a BBC announcement in July 2017 of an additional £34 
million investment in children’s services over three years from 2017/18, which 
emphasised online content. The BBC estimates it will be spending £31.4 million 
‘online’ from a children’s budget of £124.4 million by 2019/20 (BBC, 2017b). Its aim 
of directing extra funding online with ‘new forms of content and interactivity’ and 
personalised offerings (BBC, 2017b) looks out of step with Ofcom’s emphasis on 
production and transmission quotas for CBBC and CBeebies broadcasts. Origination 
quotas are also out of step with the BBC’s assertion that it would be focusing on ‘a 
smaller number of stand-out titles for which we will commission TV series and high-
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quality brand extensions across all platforms’ (BBC, 2017a, p. 11). Ofcom’s draft 
operating licence does not specify any quantitative or qualitative targets for online 
delivery even as online content takes up a greater proportion of BBC children’s 
provision. Ofcom, as the BBC’s regulator, will need to ensure that the BBC delivers 
on distinctiveness, innovation, quality and diversity here too and has undertaken to 
adjust the operating licence in line with changes in tastes and consumption, a factor 
that is particularly relevant to children. However, the BBC was more circumspect, 
fearing future hurdles to its strategy, and arguing that quotas risked the delivery of its 
mission and purposes ‘across all platforms’ because ‘Ever more, or increased, genre 
quotas on our TV and radio channels will make that harder, and risk preserving the 
BBC “as it is” rather than “where it needs to be” in future’ (BBC, 2017c, pp.20-21).  
Other stakeholders including the children’s advocacy group, Children’s Media 
Foundation (CMF, 2017b) and PACT (2017b) welcomed the quotas, but expressed 
reservations. CMF was concerned that the BBC would focus its spending on 
infrastructure rather than content, while PACT pointed out that quantitative quotas 
also needed to be backed up by maintaining investment directly in content (PACT, 
2017b, p. 9) 
The reintroduction of quotas for commercial PSBs 
The most unexpected intervention in 2017 was the reintroduction of quotas for 
commercial PSBs (ITV, Channel 4, Five) in an amendment to the UK Digital 
Economy Bill which was approved by the House of Commons on 26 April ahead of 
the June 2017 general election. The amendment gives Ofcom the power to impose the 
quotas, but crucially it also allows Ofcom to take account of children’s programmes 
on ‘services related to those channels’ such as ITV’s CiTV children’s channel or 
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online platforms, which are not included in the PSB mandate of commercial PSBs 
(House of Commons, 2017). Ofcom has to publish criteria for children’s 
programming on commercial PSBs and consult publicly on any proposals, but the 
powers could counter the failure to regulate since 2003 when transmission and output 
quotas were abolished for commercial PSBs.  
The type of quotas are not yet specified (as of 1 October 2017). Transmission quotas 
(amounts broadcast) might not benefit domestic origination if broadcasters simply 
acquire content off the shelf, as opposed to quotas, which specify amounts of 
domestic production, possibly even in underprovided genres such as drama or factual 
content or content for older children. Production investment quotas, specifying levels 
of investment in children’s content could have the most significant effect, particularly 
if these are applied to the commercial PSBs’ non PSB channels (CiTV, E4) and online 
services. The introduction of quotas would make a contestable fund more feasible, 
countering the failure to regulate, because it would give commercial PSBs an 
incentive to commission content supported by a contestable fund, although this would 
not necessarily result in significantly more investment by commercial PSBs.  
Conclusion  
This study has attempted to evaluate responses to market failure in the UK children’s 
TV market. By the end of 2017 it looked as if some of the issues associated with 
failures of incentive, regulation and structure had been addressed through contestable 
funding, BBC origination quotas and the promise of quotas for commercial PSBs. 
These interventions came about because of intense campaigning by stakeholders with 
vested interests represented by industry (PACT, Animation UK) and 
consumer/advocacy groups including the Children’s Media Foundation and Save 
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Kids’ Content (Steemers, 2017). The latter is a joint initiative between PACT, and 
children’s producer and ‘policy entrepreneur’ (Kingdon, 2011, p. 10), Anne Wood, 
who used a parliamentary lobbying company, to steer through the last-minute 
parliamentary amendment about quotas to the Digital Economy Bill.  
Stakeholder calls for interventions came about because of perceived threats to the 
production of domestic children’s television after UK commercial broadcasters 
recused themselves from investment, undermining the UK’s production ecology for 
children’s content which had depended on both the BBC and commercial PSBs.  
However, what has been remarkable about these policy interventions is that they 
make little reference to changes in children’s consumption and seem largely geared to 
supporting broadcast content rather than digital media, user participation, and new 
forms of non-linear content. Strictly speaking the children’s television market as a 
whole is not a market failure, but the arguments around children’s content go beyond 
management and economic issues. A key factor here was the perception of market 
failure that mixed both normative and emotive arguments about the need to provide 
UK children with UK content, and less transparent arguments about a section of the 
production industry that was facing terminal decline. These rather than managerial 
concerns drove stakeholder debates.  
It could be argued that UK policy-makers neglected to think about new forms of 
content for children beyond television, because of their inability to engage with wider 
issues beyond the narrow and politically charged terms of BBC Charter Review, 
where contestable funding was first outlined. This limited perspective was 
compounded by industry (PACT, Animation UK) and advocacy (CMF, VLV, Save 
Kids Content) lobby groups, who found themselves having to focus on the 
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government’s narrowly framed proposals for contestable funding (see also Steemers, 
2017), BBC quotas, and the rather hurried reintroduction of commercial PSB quotas 
in the Digital Economy Bill. These more speculative and reactive concerns took 
precedence over more substantive issues related to the long-term future of children’s 
content in the UK. In media management terms these interventions which under-
emphasised new developments in favour of television, reveal how short-term policy 
initiatives can create barriers to innovation, which may result in providers ultimately 
failing to meet either societal expectations for public service children’s content or 
market requirements. The imposition of quotas on the BBC’s linear children’s 
channels and some kind of children’s content quotas for commercial PSBs promise to 
turn the clock back, but may not provide a long-term solution for the health of UK 
production for children, particularly as the BBC shifts its priorities to online platforms 
and infrastructure. The contestable fund consultation for a limited 3-year pilot 
partially addressed options to support content on non-broadcast platforms, but offered 
little scope to address what range and type of children’s content and services (short-
form content, games, apps), public funding should be supporting.   
This demonstrates that issues of funding and policy cannot be viewed in isolation 
from considerations of where audiences for children’s public service content are 
heading, and how children are likely to discover public service content in future. 
Interventions have to be seen in the context of more holistic approaches that reflect 
other issues associated with children’s media consumption including their use of 
social media and games, and growing public concern about the dangers of online 
content and issues of care and protection as children become more involved with 
digital media and are targeted by new commercial practices and data collection. Yet 
current approaches to children’s public service content production and funding in the 
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UK, have in large part been driven by an industry-focused, broadcasting-led stance 
rather than a child-centred discourse. Following the practical disassembly of public 
service production for children over a decade because of failures in incentive, 
regulation and structure, the unanswered question is whether recent interventions, 
focused largely on broadcast platforms, will address the underlying realities of 
children’s changing media experiences, which are less likely to be channel-based in 
future. Recent interventions in the UK may be ill-designed to sustain UK-originated 
public service content over the longer term, and will require close scrutiny and 
evaluation over the coming years. 
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